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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Lawrence entered into a conditional guilty plea, preserving the issue of 
whether the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He also asserts that 
the district court abused its discretion when it executed an excessive sentence. Finally, 
Mr. Lawrence asserts that the district court erred by denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion for credit for time served. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The facts of the case regarding the motion to suppress were largely not in 
dispute in district court. The parties stipulated that the officer's initial contact with 
Mr. Lawrence was reasonable under the community caretaking function. (Tr., p.5, L.22 
- p.6, L.5.) The parties also stipulated that there was no reasonable suspicion for the 
officer to perform a Terry1 frisk. (Tr., p.6, Ls.6-9.) The only issues in dispute were 
whether Mr. Lawrence consented to be searched and whether he revoked consent to be 
searched. (See, Tr., p.6, Ls.10-13.) 
Mr. Lawrence and another man were riding a motorcycle and stopped by the side 
of the road because Mr. Lawrence's wallet fell out of his pocket. While they were 
looking for the wallet, police stopped by to see what was going on. The police 
determined that both men were fine and neither had any outstanding warrants. 
However, the officers did see that Mr. Lawrence had a prior criminal record. (R., pp.19-
20.) 
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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After an officer started searching the other man, another officer turned to 
Mr. Lawrence and the following discussion took place: 
Officer: "What about you sir?" 
Mr. Lawrence: "Uh, I got a couple cans of beer in my pockets." 
Officer: "In your pocket? You got anything else illegal on you?" 
Mr. Lawrence: "No." 
Officer: "Nothing?" 
Mr. Lawrence: "No." 
Officer: "Mind if we check?" 
Mr. Lawrence: "My pockets are full." 
Officer: "OK. Mind if I check ... " 
Mr. Lawrence: "Go ahead." [Mr. Lawrence raises his hands in the air.] 
Officer: " ... make sure you don't have anything illegal on you? Put your 
hands on top of your head." 
(Ex. 1.2) The officer then proceeded to pat down Mr. Lawrence. During the pat-down, 
the officer said: 
Officer: "What's this in here? What's this? Can I take it out? This little 
square thing? Do you mind if I take it out and see what it is?" 
Mr. Lawrence: "Yes, what is it?"3 
Officer: "I'm asking you." 
(Ex. 1.) Thereafter, the officer found marijuana in a small box and upon further search 
incident to arrest, he found methamphetamine as well. (R., p.20.) 
At the motion to suppress hearing, Mr. Lawrence's attorney argued that the 
officer's request to "check" Mr. Lawrence for anything illegal, and Mr. Lawrence's 
acquiescence, was consent only for an officer to perform a pat-down. (See Tr., p.17, 
Ls.4-13.) Counsel also argued that the reply "yes" to the question "do you mind?" 
meant Mr. Lawrence did mind if the officer pulled it out to see what's in it, and therefore, 
consent to search was revoked. (Tr., p.17, L.14-p.20, L.8.) 
2 Relevant portions appear on the video at 00:50-02:00. (Ex. 1.) 
3 The district court found that Mr. Lawrence said ''Yes, what is it?" (Tr., p.18, Ls.22-24.) 
Based on the audio from the videotape, is hard to discern exactly what Mr. Lawrence 
said immediately before "what is it?" {Ex. 1.) 
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The court found that Mr. Lawrence "clearly could have said I do mind and I'm 
declining to have you go through my pockets. What I see is instead the response, 'yes 
what is it,' is yes, go though my pockets and tell me what it is." (Tr., p.24, Ls.18-23.) 
The district court found that the State met its burden based on the totality of the 
circumstances and denied the motion to suppress. (Tr., p.24, L.23 - p.25, L.15.) 
The district court did not specifically rule on the issue of revocation of consent. 
(See Tr., pp.21-25.) 
Mr. Lawrence entered a conditional guilty plea for Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), with a Persistent Narcotics Violator Enhancement, 
I.C. § 37-2739, preserving the suppression issue. (Tr., p.26, Ls.9-13, p.42, L.25 - p.43, 
L.2.) The district court executed a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, 
and granted 159 days credit for time served. (R., pp.51-52.) 
Mr. Lawrence filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency and credit for time 
served of 17 days from August 20, 2010 to February 15, 2011. (See R., pp.53-54.) 
Which the district court denied. (Order Denying Criminal Rule 35.) 
Mr. Lawrence timely appeals from the district court's order denying the motion to 
suppress, judgment of conviction, and order denying the Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.49, 
51-52, 55-56; Order Denying Criminal Rule 35.) 
3 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress when it failed 
to address whether Mr. Lawrence revoked consent to search. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it executed an excessive 
sentence. 





The District Court Erred When It Denied The Motion To Suppress Because lt Did Not 
Consider Mr. Lawrence's Withdraw Of Consent 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred in denying the motion to suppress because it did not 
properly address the issue of whether Mr. Lawrence withdrew or revoked his consent to 
be searched. 
B. Standard 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which 
were supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 695 
(Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Consider Whether Mr. Lawrence 
Withdrew Or Revoked Consent To Search 
Mr. Lawrence does not dispute the district court's findings of fact, but instead 
challenges the application of constitutional principles to the facts found. The district 
court found that Mr. Lawrence replied "yes" when the officer asked "do you mind if I take 
it out and see what it is?" (Tr., p.18, Ls.22-24.) Despite this finding, the district court 
denied the motion to suppress. (Tr., p.25, Ls.14-15.) Mr. Lawrence asserts that the 
district court erred when it did not address the issue of revocation or the withdrawal of 
the consent to search and thereby failed to apply the constitutional principles to the 
plain meaning of Mr. Lawrence's statements. ( See Tr., pp.21-25.) 
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The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and seizures be reasonable. 
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within a 
specifically established and well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement. 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991 ); State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 863 
(Ct. App. 1997). When a warrantless search or seizure has occurred, the State bears a 
heavy burden to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. State v. Bower, 135 
Idaho 554 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984); 
State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225 (1993); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 434 (Ct. App. 
1996)). If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded 
as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
One exception to the warrant search is a search done pursuant to the owner's voluntary 
consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,219, (1974). 
However, consent to search may be withdrawn or revoked. State v. Thorpe, 141 
Idaho 151, 152-53 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 694-95 (Ct. App. 
1999). "Additionally, when the basis for a search is consent, the government must 
conform to the limitations placed upon the right granted to search." Thorpe, 141 Idaho at 
154 (citing United States v. Ward, 576 F.2d 243, 244 (9th Cir. 1978); Mason v. Pulliam, 
557 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1977)). "The standard for measuring the scope of consent 
under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness, 'what would the 
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and 
the suspect."' Id. (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). 
In this case, Mr. Lawrence agreed to let the officer "check" to see if he had 
anything illegal on him. (Ex. 1.) The officer then did a pat-down search of 
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Mr. Lawrence. (Ex. 1.) A reasonable person would have understood this pat-down 
search to be the limit of the consent to search because when the officer inquired if he 
could make a further intrusion, and asked Mr. Lawrence if he would mind a more 
intrusive search, the district court held that Mr. Lawrence answered "yes." (Tr., p.18, 
Ls.22-24.) The reply "yes" could only mean "yes, I do mind" given the way the question 
was framed. Objection to the further search constituted Mr. Lawrence's revocation of 
his previous consent. A reasonable person would have understood Mr. Lawrence's 
exchange with the officer to be a revocation of consent to search. The district court's 
application of constitutional principles to the facts of this case found that "yes" means 
"no." The district court erred when it found consent without specifically addressing 
whether Mr. Lawrence revoked consent. (See Tr., pp.21-25.) Therefore, because 
consent to search was revoked, the district court erred when it denied the motion to 
suppress. 
Mr. Lawrence asks this Court to reverse the district court and grant the motion to 
dismiss. Alternatively, he asks this Court to remand so the district court can address 
the revocation issue, which was not addressed below. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence 
Of Eight Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Lawrence Following Plea Of 
Guilty To Possession Of A Controlled Substance With A Persistent Narcotics 
Violator Enhancement 
Mr. Lawrence asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
fourteen years, with two years fixed, is excessive. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
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giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, 
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting 
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 ( 1979)). Mr. Lawrence does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Lawrence must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992)). The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 
Idaho 138 (2001)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered 
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. 
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). Mr. Lawrence has a long history of substance abuse. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.16-17.) The substance abuse 
evaluator recommend Mr. Lawrence participate in the CAP program for substance 
abuse treatment and Mr. Lawrence indicated he is ready to change his ways. (PSI, 
pp.17, 37-38.) 
Another aspect that should have received the attention of the district court is the 
fact that Mr. Lawrence has strong support from family members. (PSI, p.12.) See 
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State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-95 ( 1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who 
had the support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). 
Idaho recognizes that good employment history should be considered a 
mitigating factor. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) see also State v. Shideler, 
103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). Mr. Lawrence served in the military and has a wide variety 
of work experience. (PSI, p.14.) 
For all these reasons, Mr. Lawrence also asserts that his sentence is excessive 
and he requests this Court reduce his sentence as it sees fit. 
111. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Lawrence's Rule 35 Motion 
For Credit For Time Served 
Mr. Lawrence requested the district court grant him credit for 179 days ant the 
court gave him credit for 159 at sentencing and subsequently denied the Rule 35. 
(Order Denying Credit for Time Served.) 
"A motion to correct the computation of credit for time served prior to sentencing 
may be made at any time." I.C.R. 35. The court of appeals addressed computation of 
credit for time served in State v. Albertson, 135 Idaho 723 (Ct. App. 2001). 
The computation of time served on a sentence of incarceration is 
governed by I.C. § 18-309, which provides: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against 
whom the judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the 
judgment for any period of incarceration prior to entry of 
judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense or +an 
included offense for which the judgment was entered. The 
remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement 
of sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the 
defendant by any legal means is temporarily released from 
such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the 
9 
Id. at 725. 
time during which he was at large must not be computed as 
part of such term. 
In his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Lawrence asked the district court to correct the 
calculation of his credit for time served to include the 20 days. (R., pp.53-54.) Prior to 
the judgment of conviction, he was incarcerated from August 20, 2010 to February 15, 
2011, which is 179 days. (See R., pp.51-54.) The district court granted only 159 days. 
(R., pp.51-52.) The district court did not rule on Mr. Lawrence's Rule 35 motion for 
credit for time served. (See Order Denying Criminal Rule 35.) He requests that he be 
granted 20 days credit for time served prior to the judgment of conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Lawrence respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court and 
grant the motion to dismiss. Alternatively, he asks this Court to remand so the district 
court can address the revocation issue, which was not addressed below. Furthermore, 
he requests this court reduce his sentence as it sees fit. Finally, he requests that he be 
granted 179 days credit for time served prior to the judgment of conviction. 
DATED this 2nd day of September, 2011. ??/// 
JORDAN::g.JAYLOR 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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